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Abstract 
 
Positive network externalities can arise when consumers benefit from the consumption of 
compatible products by other consumers (user-positive consumption externalities) or, 
alternatively, when they incur costs from the consumption of incompatible products by other 
consumers (nonuser-negative consumption externalities).  But whereas user-positive externalities 
are typically mutually imposed and imply mutual benefit because they relate to interoperability, 
with nonuser-negative externalities the costs of incompatibility may be imposed unilaterally and 
borne asymmetrically.  For example, increased risks of death and injury on the roads due to the 
co-existence of large and small vehicles are imposed exclusively by the owners of the large 
vehicles and borne exclusively by the occupants of the small vehicles.  This paper compares the 
social optimality of incentives for compatibility under regimes involving user-positive and 
nonuser-negative externalities.  Earlier work with respect to user-positive externalities (e.g., Katz 
and Shapiro, 1985) suggests that firms with relatively small networks or weak reputations tend to 
be biased in favor of compatibility, while individual firms’ incentives for compatibility are 
suboptimal when their networks are closely matched in size.  Meanwhile, intuition suggests that 
with nonuser-negative externalities incentives for incompatibility should always be excessive, 
reflecting the notion that activities involving unilaterally imposed negative externalities will 
always be overprovided by the market (in the absence of regulation or Coaseian mitigation).  
Using a “location” model of differentiated products, we find that, under both regimes, incentives 
for compatibility tend to be suboptimal when firms’ networks are close in size, and excessive for 
the small firm when the networks differ greatly in size.  Surprising public policy implications 
with respect to externalities are discussed.
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I.  Introduction 
 
 It has long been recognized that, in various situations, the utility that an agent 
derives from consuming a good may depend upon the choices made by other agents with 
respect to consuming the same good, a compatible good, or competing goods.  In their 
seminal paper, Katz and Shapiro (1985) noted that inter-user impacts on utility, or 
network externalities, exist where the number of users has a direct physical effect on the 
quality of the product (e.g., in the telephone network), or where the number of users has 
an indirect impact on the desirability of a product through its effect on the availability 
and quality of complementary goods (e.g., with respect to computer hardware and 
software, and service networks for durable goods).  The cases they describe involve 
positive consumption externalities, whereby consumers benefit from the purchase or use 
of compatible products by other consumers.  Following Katz and Shapiro, the network 
externalities literature has focused predominantly on positive consumption externalities; 
many discussions, like Katz and Shapiro’s, have essentially equated the two.2 
 Network externalities are, however, not limited to positive consumption 
externalities.  It is possible to classify four types of consumption externalities, based on 
the valence of the externality (positive or negative) and who the externality affects 
(product users or nonusers).  Positive network externalities could theoretically arise from 
two of these: user-positive and nonuser-negative consumption externalities.  In the latter 
case, a network externality arises because, when users of a product impose costs 
exclusively or to a greater extent on those who do not use the product, an incremental 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Gilbert (1992), Katz and Shapiro (1992), and Economides (1996a, 1996b). 
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user increases the preferences of other consumers for using the product relative to not 
using it. 
 Nonuser-negative externalities are not merely an object of theoretical speculation.  
Examples abound.  When a market offering competes with a public good (or, more 
generally, publicly-provided free good), such as bottled water with tap water, or private 
schools with public schools, a consumer who switches from the publicly-provided good 
to the market good reduces political support for maintaining the quality of the former.3  
The consumer who switched is shielded from adverse effect, because she no longer relies 
on the public good.  A similar situation is posed by the phenomenon of “white flight”: 
white people who flee urban areas that are becoming racially integrated impose “costs” 
(albeit as viewed from the racist perspective of preference for “whiter” communities) on 
the whites that remain behind.  Meanwhile, they shield themselves, by fleeing, from the 
same costs. 
 Another example of the phenomenon is presented by what one might call 
“combatant goods,” which bundle greater imposition of external costs with greater 
protection against the same costs, relative to alternatives.  For example, sport utility 
vehicles (SUVs) impose greater risks of injury and death on other motorists than do cars, 
while at the same time providing their occupants with increased protection against these 
same risks relative to cars.  Visible car-theft deterrent devices (such as the Club) tend to 
push thieves to other cars, including those protected by invisible deterrent devices (such 
                                                 
3 Given the nonexcludability characteristic of public goods, when we talk about “switching away” from 
such goods we are talking about consumers who choose no longer to rely on the benefits they provide.  For 
example, the consumer who places her house on stilts is still literally consuming the flood protection 
provided by a nearby levee, but she is choosing not to rely on it. 
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as Lojack); thus they redistribute crime rather than reducing it, while inoculating their 
owners against the effects of such redistribution (Ian Ayres and Steven D. Levitt 1998).  
 Yet a further example can be found in situations where a consumer’s adoption of 
a noisome product reduces her displeasure from others’ use of the product, either because 
personal use increases habituation to others’ use, or because personal use changes 
attitudes through reaction to cognitive dissonance.4  For example, smokers tend to find 
secondhand smoke less objectionable than non-smokers (Beh 1989).  Meanwhile, people 
who hire contractors to engage in construction work on their houses might be less likely 
to find neighbors’ noisy construction projects objectionable.  Similarly, the fact that one’s 
neighbors are polluting a shared lake through pesticide runoff or by using motorboats 
may be viewed less unfavorably if one is doing these things oneself.  Such “if you can’t 
beat ‘em, join ‘em” influences might be relevant to a wide range of consumer choice 
situations, including not just decisions with respect to whether to use a product, as in the 
examples above, but also choices between competing products (e.g., loud gas-powered 
lawn mower versus quiet electric mower; McMansion versus modest house; etc.). 
 An important difference between the network externalities that typically arise 
from user-positive externalities and those typically arising from nonuser-negative 
externalities involves mutuality of effect.  User-positive externalities typically relate to 
interoperability, that is, the ability of one user’s product to work in connection with 
                                                 
4 Cognitive dissonance may be described as the internal conflict that results when an individual receives 
information that contradicts basic ego-supporting beliefs.  For example, an individual tends to think of 
herself, “I am a nice person who would never do something to irritate or harm an undeserving person.”  So 
when the individual engages in an activity that she has found irritating in the past when others did it, she 
might avert the potential for internal stress by changing her attitude toward the activity so as to view it as 
less noisome.  Evidence of such attitude changes in dissonance-provoking situations is provided by Leon 
Festinger and James M. Carlsmith (1959), Keith Davis and Edward Jones (1960), and David Glass (1964).  
For an economic discussion of cognitive dissonance, see George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens 
(1982). 
 4
another user’s product, or the ability of one user’s product to make use of the 
complementary goods that another user’s product employs.  Thus the benefits from 
usership are mutual, that is, the consumers that enjoy the benefits of having other users 
on their network in turn benefit those other users.  For example, when I purchase a 
computer with a Windows operating system, I benefit from the variety of software 
available for Windows due to the large number of other users; at the same time, as one of 
those users, I contribute to the software variety benefits that others receive.  When it 
comes to compatibility, a key strategic question facing firms is whether, and to what 
extent, to extend the mutual benefits to competing products’ consumers.  Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) observe that firms with large networks are biased against compatibility, 
while firms with small networks are biased in favor of it.  It would seem that mutual 
propagation of compatibility benefits is at the heart of this result: firms with small 
networks would seem to gain more when compatibility is extended to them because their 
consumers gain the benefits of interoperability with a larger mass of consumers, while 
what they offer in return is interoperability with a smaller mass of consumers. 
But nonuser-negative externalities, arising in situations such as those depicted 
above, operate differently: they involve costs imposed unilaterally – not mutually – by 
agents who take an action on those who do not take the same action or a compatible 
action.  In these situations, when the imposing action involves the use of a product, the 
strategic question facing the product manufacturer as relates to compatibility is how large 
to make the negative externality.  That is, how incompatible should the product be with 
 5
competing products? 5  Here, intuition suggests, because the external costs are imposed 
unilaterally, that private incentives for incompatibility are always excessive. 
 This paper compares incentives for compatibility under the regimes involving 
user-positive externalities and nonuser-negative externalities.  We focus on incentives for 
unilateral action on compatibility (e.g., in the case of user-positive externalities, 
developing an adapter), rather than joint action (e.g., developing a standard).  We analyze 
a “location” model of differentiated products.  In this sense, the approach is similar to the 
analyses of network externalities offered by Farrell and Saloner (1992) and Matutes and 
Regibeau (1988, 1992), and different from the homogenous products model of Katz and 
Shapiro (1985).  Our findings for user-positive externalities essentially replicate the 
results of Katz and Shapiro (1985) concerning the relationship of firm size to 
compatibility incentives.  But the findings for nonuser-negative externalities do not bear 
out our intuition on excessive incentives.  Instead, we find incentives for incompatibility 
that follow closely, though not exactly, Katz and Shapiro’s findings relating optimality of 
firms’ incentives to network size.  Whereas firms that are close in size tend to have 
socially excessive incentives for incompatibility, an imposing firm has insufficient 
incentives for incompatibility if its “network” (customer base) is relatively very small or 
very large. 
                                                 
5 Enlarging external costs might be accomplished by dint of product design.  For example, external costs 
imposed by the Club might be manipulated by altering its size, color, and shape to make it more or less 
obvious to prospective thieves.  (For further discussion of visible car-theft deterrents, see Ayres and Levitt 
1998.)  Similarly, the external costs imposed by SUVs might be enlarged by building these vehicles with 
stiffer and higher front ends, thereby increasing the damage imposed on the vehicles with which they 
collide (Keith Bradsher 2002; Howard Latin and Bobby Kasolas 2002).  Enlarging external costs might 
also be accomplished through marketing messages.  For example, under the practice known as 
“blockbusting,” unscrupulous real estate agents “warn” white residents in a neighborhood to sell quickly 
and avoid losses on their houses as blacks move in.  More subtle practices include planting large “For Sale” 
or “Sold” signs on neighborhood properties (Georgetown Law Journal 1970).  Such actions call attention 
to, and thereby exacerbate perceptions of, the negative effect that the exodus of home owners has on those 
who choose to stay put. 
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 The next section lays out the general model.  Section 3 derives welfare results for 
the user-positive externalities case.  Section 4 derives welfare results for the nonuser-
negative externalities case.  Section 5 offers a public policy discussion and concludes. 
 
II.  A Model of Differentiated Product Duopoly with Network Externalities 
 
 Consider a market for two products, A and B, sold at prices Ap  and Bp , 
respectively.  Consumers are distributed uniformly on a unit segment based on their 
preferences for A versus B, with the total number of consumers normalized to 1.  
Consumers choose whether to purchase A or B; each consumer will choose at most one 
unit of one of the two products.  We consider a general framework of network effects as 
given by the following utility functions, representing the utility that the consumer located 
at a point j (1 0j≥ ≥ ) obtains from purchasing a unit of product A or B, respectively: 
 ( ) ( )1A A A BX B AU j v t j Q Q pθ σ λ σ λ= + − − + + −  (1) 
 ( )B B B AX A BU j v tj Q Q pθ σ λ σ λ= − − + + −  (2) 
Here, v represents the demand for all products; θ , which may be positive or negative, 
parameterizes the demand for A relative to B; t represents the intensity of consumers’ 
relative preferences for A or B ( 0t > ); iQ  is the number of consumers who purchase 
product i ( ,i A B= ); λ  parameterizes the overall size of the network effect ( 0λ ≥ ); and 
iσ  sizes and signs an own component of the network effect ( [ ]1,1iσ ∈ − ), while iXσ  
similarly sizes and signs a cross component of the network effect ( [ ]1,1iXσ ∈ − ).  A 
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consumer who chooses neither A nor B receives utility of zero.  Each consumer makes 
the choice that maximizes her utility. 
 Now, consider two cases: (I) 1A Bσ σ= = , 0λ >  are given, and firm A sets 
[ ]0,1X AX BXσ σ σ≡ = ∈ ; and (II) 1AXσ = − , 0A B BXσ σ σ= = =  are given, and firm A sets 
λ .   The first case is the classic case of a user-positive externality: incremental users of A 
and B provide a benefit, λ , to other users of the same product.  The decision that firm A 
faces is whether, and to what extent, to include firm B’s consumers in the network.  Does 
firm A makes B’s consumers fully compatible with its own consumers, or partially 
compatible, or not at all?  Note that the decision to make firm B’s consumers compatible 
also means that firm A’s consumers are compatible with firm B’s, so that B’s consumers 
receive increased network benefits as well; thus the benefits are mutual.  Further, note 
that we assume, in Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) parlance, that the compatibility technology 
is an “adaptor,” hence A and B are compatible if either A or B decide to undertake the 
expense to make them compatible.  Since our purpose is to examine whether the level of 
compatibility chosen by a firm of a given network size is too high or too low, we assume 
without loss of generality that only A makes the decision of whether to make the products 
compatible. 
 The second case involves a nonuser-negative externality: firm A considers the 
possibility of imposing a negative externality that only affects the users of product B.  We 
shall show that the effect of doing this is also to create a network externality: when 
0λ > , the reservation price of users of A increases with the number of users of A, all else 
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equal.6  But A’s decision to make B’s users more incompatible with product A does not 
have a mutual effect: A’s users are not reciprocally harmed by users of B.  That is, B is 
made more incompatible with A, but A is not made more incompatible with B. 
 It might seem that we already understand the relative private and social incentives 
for compatibility in this case.  As discussed in the introduction, since the incompatibility 
decision involves a unilaterally imposed negative externality, the incompatibility 
incentives of firm A would seem always to be excessive, unlike in the case of user-
positive externalities.  The model considers whether that expectation is correct. 
 
III. Equilibrium with User-Positive Externalities 
 
 Setting parameters to the values proposed for case (I) above, (1) and (2) become: 
 ( ) ( )1A A X B AU j v t j Q Q pθ λ σ λ= + − − + + −  (3) 
 ( )B B X A BU j v tj Q Q pθ λ σ λ= − − + + −  (4) 
Let us assume v is large enough that all consumers choose A or B at equilibrium prices, 
implying 1A BQ Q= − .7 
 Combining (3) and (4) reveals that the consumer at j prefers A over B if 
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 1 X A B B At j Q Q p pθ σ λ− − + − − + > .  We can therefore think of  
                                                 
6 Nagler (2008) examines a more general framework allowing [ ]1, 0Aσ ∈ − , so that the degree of 
“selectivity” of the negative externality is a parameter in the analysis,.  The extreme case 1Aσ = −  
represents a pure negative externality due to the use of product A, with no consequent network externality; 
while varying values of ( ]1, 0Aσ ∈ −  varies both the degree of selectivity and size of the network 
externality. 
7 Consider v tθ ε≡ + +  for arbitrary 0ε > .  Then, for all , 0Xλ σ > , there exists 0Bp >  such that 
0BU > .  Thus v  satisfies the requirement. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 1j X A B Bt j Q Q pθ σ λΨ = − − + − − +  (5) 
as the consumer’s reservation price for A, relative to B.  It is interesting also to note that 
the relative quantity of A versus B matters more to the relative willingness-to-pay the less 
compatible the two products are. 
 Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), we assume that firm A incurs a fixed cost of 
compatibility, ( )XC σ λ .  This is assumed to depend upon the size of the compatibility 
benefit received by its users from each incremental user of B, and which B’s users 
receive in turn from the incremental user of A.  For simplicity, assume ( )X XC kσ λ σ λ=  
for 0k > .  Firm A sets Ap  and Xσ  to maximize 
 A A A Xp Q kσ λΠ = −  (6) 
while firm B sets Bp  to maximize 
 B B Bp QΠ =  (7) 
We restrict attention to tλ < , which is required for a stable interior solution; otherwise a 
small exogenous shift of consumers between products results, through the network effect, 
in all consumers shifting. 
 For an interior solution, * Aj pΨ = , where *j  represents the threshold consumer 
(i.e., *1AQ j= − ).  Assuming such a solution, using (5), and making appropriate 
substitutions we obtain 
 ( )( )
1 2
2 1
A B X
A
X
t p p
Q
t
σ λ θ
σ λ
− + − − += − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 (8) 
and 
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 ( )( )
1 2
1
2 1
X A B
B A
X
t p p
Q Q
t
σ λ θ
σ λ
− − + − −= − = − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 (9) 
The first-order conditions for firm A’s profit maximization with respect to Ap  and Xσ , 
respectively, are given by 
 
( )
( )
* * *
*
1 2 2
0
2 1
X A B
X
t p p
t
σ λ θ
σ λ
− − − + + =⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
 (10) 
 
( )
( )
* 1
2
*1
A A
X
p Q
k
t σ λ
− =⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
 (11) 
The first-order condition for firm B’s problem is 
 
( )
( )
* * *
*
1 2 2
0
2 1
X A B
X
t p p
t
σ λ θ
σ λ
− − + − − =⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
 (12) 
 It is immediately clear from (11) that a corner solution is the only equilibrium 
when 12AQ ≥ : firm A would like to set 0Xσ <  because the marginal benefit of 
compatibility at any positive level of compatibility is negative when firm A has more 
than half the market.  Meanwhile, for 12AQ < , the smaller AQ , the greater firm A wishes 
to set Xσ .  Thus, the smaller the market share of a firm on this range, the greater its 
incentives for compatibility. 
 Solving (10) and (12) together yields 
 ( )* * 231A Xp t σ λ θ= − − +  (13) 
and 
 ( )* * 231B Xp t σ λ θ= − − −  (14) 
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This yields the result, consistent with Farrell and Saloner (1992), that compatibility in the 
presence of network externalities under a differentiated product duopoly implies higher 
prices.  Incentives to cut price to achieve greater sales through enlargement of the own-
product-specific network effect are diminished the more compatible the products are.  
Substituting (13) and (14) into (8) provides a useful partial-reduced-form for AQ , 
 
( )
( )
*2
3
*
1
2 1
X
A
X
t
Q
t
θ σ λ
σ λ
+ − −= ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
 (15) 
 Solving (11) explicitly for ( )*1 Xσ λ−  yields two roots: 
 ( )* 161 1 1 8X kt kσ λ θ ⎡ ⎤− = + ± −⎣ ⎦  (16) 
As we demonstrate in the appendix, the values of *Xσ  that correspond to both roots are 
maxima.  It is not necessary to our welfare results to determine which value of *Xσ  is 
preferred by firm A; we are able to proceed with (16).  Substituting (16) into (13) and 
(14) yields the following corresponding equilibrium prices and quantities: 
 ( ) ( )* * 2 1 2 13 6 3 6, 1 1 8 , 1 1 8A B k kp p k kθ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − ± − − − ± −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (17) 
 ( )* * 1 12 22 2, ,1 1 8 1 1 8A B k kQ Q k k⎛ ⎞= − +⎜ ⎟± − ± −⎝ ⎠  (18) 
 The equilibrium offers an interesting finding on how firm A uses compatibility 
over the range of interior solution:  it sets Xσ  as a “buffer” to keep AQ  at an optimizing 
level that is independent of θ .  A lower level of demand will cause A to set Xσ  and Ap  
higher (hence, Bp  will be higher as well – recall that prices rise with compatibility), 
keeping AQ  steady at the level given in (18).  Meanwhile, when demand is high enough 
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or low enough to correspond to a corner solution with respect to compatibility, firm A 
does not buffer its output.  Equation (16) shows that 0Xσ >  requires ( )61 1 8 0k tkλθ −± −< < .  At 
higher levels of demand, as inspection of (15) indicates, firm A sets 0Xσ =  and allows 
AQ  to vary positively with Ap .  Meanwhile, 1Xσ <  requires 61 1 8kt kθ −± −> .8  When demand 
is below this lower threshold, firm A favors full compatibility, sets 1Xσ = , and again 
allows AQ  to vary positively with Ap . 
 We now turn to the question of how the level of compatibility chosen by firm A 
relates to the social optimum.  Define welfare as 
 ( ) ( )
*
*
1
0
j
A B A B
j
W U j dj U j dj≡ Π +Π + +∫ ∫  (19) 
Substituting and integrating, we obtain 
 ( ) ( )2 22 1 2 2 2 tA X A X A AW t Q t p Q vσ λ θ σ λ λ θ λ= Π + − − + + + − − + − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (20) 
Differentiating this expression with respect to Xσ , we obtain the following results: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Unless the costs of compatibility are very large, when the firms are 
the same or close to the same size, the unilateral private incentives for each firm with 
respect to compatibility are too low.  When the firms are not close in size, the smaller 
firm has socially excessive incentives to seek compatibility unilaterally. 
 
COROLLARY 1: When the firm’s network is small enough for it to choose partial or full 
compatibility, it always overinvests in compatibility. 
                                                 
8 Note that ( )6 6
1 1 8 1 1 8
k t kt
k k
λ− −
± − ± −> . 
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 The results are essentially consistent with the findings of Katz and Shapiro (1985) 
that firms with large networks or good reputations are biased against compatibility, 
whereas those with small networks or weak reputations are biased in favor of it.  In fact, 
we find in our simple model that any firm with a small enough network to seek some 
degree of compatibility is biased in favor of compatibility.  This finding, which has a 
“Catch 22” flavor to it, has to do with a horizontal externality implicit in the use of 
compatibility in the “zero-sum” context of the model.  A firm who seeks compatibility 
does so as a method of increasing the relative reservation price of consumers with respect 
its product.  Because increases in firm A’s sales come at the expense of firm B over the 
range of parameter values considered in the model, compatibility is providing a private 
benefit to the firm that exceeds its social benefit. 
 
IV. Equilibrium with Nonuser-Negative Externalities 
 
 Now let us set parameters to the values proposed for case (II).  (1) and (2) 
become: 
 ( ) ( )1A AU j v t j pθ= + − − −  (21) 
 ( )B A BU j v tj Q pθ λ= − − − −  (22) 
Again assume v large enough that all consumers choose A or B at equilibrium prices.9  
Combining (21) and (22) we obtain 
                                                 
9 As shall be shown, 1A BQ Q+ = implies v does not appear in the first-order conditions for A’s profit 
maximization.  This means *
1A BQ Q
λ + = , A’s profit-maximizing choice of λ subject to all consumers 
 14
 ( )2 1 2j A BQ t j pθ λΨ = + − − +  (23) 
as the consumer’s reservation price for A, relative to B. 
 Note that, if 0λ > , the consumer’s relative reservation price for A increases with 
AQ .  Therefore, a network externality exists for A if 0λ > .  In other words, a negative 
externality that selectively affects nonusers fosters a network externality. 
 Firm A incurs a fixed cost of incompatibility, ( )C λ , which depends upon the size 
of the incompatibility cost imposed on product B’s users by each incremental user of A.  
For simplicity, assume ( )C kλ λ=  for , 0k λ > .10 
 Firm A therefore sets Ap  and λ  to maximize 
 A A Ap Q kλΠ = −  (24) 
 
while, as in the previous case, firm B sets Bp  to maximize (7). 
 For an interior solution, * Aj pΨ = , where *j  represents the threshold consumer 
(i.e., *1AQ j= − ).  Assuming such a solution, using (23), and making appropriate 
substitutions we obtain 
 2
2
A B
A
t p pQ
t
θ
λ
− + += −  (25) 
and 
 21
2
A B
B A
t p pQ Q
t
λ θ
λ
− + − −= − = −  (26) 
                                                                                                                                                 
choosing to purchase A or B, is a function of exogenous parameters other than v.   Accordingly, 
*
1A BQ Q
v tθ λ ε
+ =
≡ + + +  satisfies the requirement for arbitrarily small 0ε > . 
10 Nagler (2008) assumes a convex cost of incompatibility, with a linear, increasing marginal cost to 
enlarging the negative externality.  The structure used here simplifies the equilibrium solution, but does not 
have a significant impact on the main results. 
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The first-order conditions for A’s and B’s profit maximization, respectively, are given by 
 
* *
*
2 2 0
2
A Bt p p
t
θ
λ
− + + =−  (27) 
 
*
*2
A Ap Q k
t λ =−  (28) 
and 
 
* * *
*
2 2 0
2
A Bt p p
t
λ θ
λ
− + − − =−  (29) 
Solving (27) and (29) together yields 
 * *2 13 3Ap t θ λ= + −  (30) 
 * *2 23 3Bp t θ λ= − −  (31) 
 Comparing (30) and (31) to (13) and (14), one is struck by the similarity of the 
equations.  With Xσ  set to zero, the equations are identical, but for the coefficients on 
*λ .  Thus, in the current case, we obtain a pricing result that is the precise flipside to the 
result in the previous case: incompatibility implies lower prices.  In both the case of user-
positive externalities and nonuser-negative externalities, the price effect is proportional to 
the size of the network effect. 
However, if one compares the price differential in the current case with the 
differential in the previous case, an important difference emerges.  With user-positive 
externalities, the price differential between the products is independent of the network 
effect.  This follows naturally from the mutuality of the network effect.  But with 
nonuser-negative externalities, the price premium for product A increases with the 
network effect.  Because this case involves a negative externality imposed unilaterally, 
the “victimized” product, B, is in effect degraded relative to the imposing product, A.  
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This will have important implications for the social optimality of the privately chosen 
level of incompatibility. 
We now determine the equilibrium value of λ  and corresponding equilibrium 
prices and quantities.  Substituting (30) and (31) into (25) obtains 
 
*2 1
3 3
*2A
tQ
t
θ λ
λ
+ −= −  (32) 
and substituting this into (28) yields 
 ( )1* 3
1
3
2
2
t
t
k
θλ += − −  (33) 
Note that an interior solution in quantities requires 2tλ < , hence 19k <  for 2tθ < − , and 
1
9k >  for 2tθ > − .  Moreover, 0λ >  requires 1
3
2 6t t
k
θ+ <− .  Thus, observing what 
happens as k approaches 19  in (33), it becomes evident that 19k >  implies a corner 
solution of 0λ =  for all 2tθ < − , and 19k <  implies 0λ =  for all 2tθ > − . 
 Does *λ  given in (33) represent a maximum?  Using (30) and (32), we may re-
write the first derivative of A’s profit function with respect to λ  as 
 2A AQ kλ
∂Π = −∂  (34) 
The second derivative is therefore  
 
2
2 2
AQA
AQ λλ
∂
∂
∂ Π =∂  (35) 
where, using (32), 
 ( )( )
1
3
2*
2
2
A tQ
t
θ
λ λ
+∂ =∂ −
 (36) 
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Successive substitution of (33) into (36) and then into (35) shows that the second 
derivative is positive when 2tθ > − , and negative otherwise.  When demand for product A 
is relatively large, the marginal revenue product of λ  increases in λ , while marginal cost 
of λ  is constant.  A corner solution equilibrium is the result: Firm A’s profits are 
maximized by setting λ  large enough to achieve 1AQ =  (if the cost of increasing λ  to 
this value is small enough relative to the benefit of taking the entire market) or else 
setting 0λ =  (if raising λ  is prohibitively costly).  However, when demand for product 
A is relatively small, the marginal revenue product of λ  decreases in λ , while marginal 
cost is constant.  Consequently, the first-order condition for profit maximization yields a 
maximum.  
 For 2tθ < − , the profit-maximum represented by (33) corresponds to the following 
prices and quantities: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )13* * 3
1 1
3 3
2 12
, ,
k
A B
t kt
p p
k k
θθ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤+ −+ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
 (37) 
 ( ) ( )* *, ,1A BQ Q k k= −  (38) 
 
As in the case of user-positive externalities, we find a “buffering” result, that is, Firm A 
sets λ as a buffer to keep AQ  at an optimizing level that is independent of θ .  A lower 
level of θ  causes A to set λ  lower and Ap  higher.  Firm B raises Bp  as well – recall that 
prices fall with incompatibility – and the price differential B Ap p− , which is positive in 
this region of low relative demand for A, increases as λ  falls.  Thus, AQ  remains steady 
at the level given in (38). 
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 When demand is low enough to correspond to 0λ =  in (33), to wit, when 
3
23t k tθ < − , equilibrium prices and quantities are given, respectively, by 
 ( ) ( )* * 2 23 3, ;A Bp p t tθ θ= + −  (39) 
 ( ) ( )1 12 3 2 3, ;A B t tQ Q θ θ= + −  (40) 
In this region, λ  is not available for buffering output, so firm A sets its price to allow AQ  
to decline with θ . 
 We now turn to the question of how the level of incompatibility chosen by firm A 
relates to the social optimum.  Define welfare as above in (19).  Substituting and 
integrating, we obtain 
 [ ] [ ]2 22 tA A A AW t Q p t Q vλ θ λ θ= Π + − + − + − − + −  (41) 
Differentiating with respect to λ , we obtain the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: When the imposing firm is small relative to its competitor, or when it 
is relatively large and the costs of incompatibility are large but not prohibitive, its 
incentives for incompatibility may be too low.  When the imposing firm and its 
competitor are close in size, its incentives for incompatibility are too high, except when 
the costs of incompatibility are relatively large, in which case social and private 
incentives conform for zero incompatibility (i.e., perfect compatibility). 
 
 Table 1 summarizes more specifically the social optimality outcomes with respect 
to firm A’s incompatibility decision in terms of the incompatibility cost parameter, k, and 
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relative demand parameter, θ .  As with Proposition 2, these results are derived in the 
appendix. 
*** INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE *** 
 The intuition of the results for nonuser-negative externalities can be seen from the 
car and sport-utility vehicle case example.  When demands for cars and SUVs are 
relatively close in size, the SUV manufacturer’s incentives for incompatibility may be 
excessive.  Making SUVs more hazardous to car drivers provides maximum benefit to the 
SUV manufacturer when the network sizes for the two vehicle types are near equal 
because the effect on SUV sales at the margin is greatest.  However, the social cost of 
vehicle incompatibility is also highest in this situation, since the probability of deadly car 
versus SUV accidents is greatest when cars and SUVs coexist on the road in near equal 
numbers (White, 2004). 
 Meanwhile, when SUVs significantly outnumber cars, the manufacturer’s 
incentives for incompatibility may be too low.  This is because manufacturers fail to 
account for the social benefit that SUV-imposed external costs have of increasing 
homogeneity of the product mix, so that the incidence of car versus SUV accidents is 
reduced.  Similarly, SUV firms’ incentives for incompatibility are too low when cars 
significantly outnumber SUVs.  In this situation, the increase in the price differential 
between SUVs and cars has a negative effect on SUV sales that outstrips the positive 
network effect.  So, though SUVs are made more dangerous, the number of SUVs 
declines sufficiently to increase welfare overall.  In both cases of lopsided network size, 
the manufacturer considers mainly the marginal effect of incompatibility on his sales, and 
this is smaller the more lopsided the network sizes are. 
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 Though not exact, there is a strong correspondence between the results we 
obtained with respect to user-positive externalities and those that arise under nonuser-
negative externalities.  The clearest correspondence exists for firms with relatively low 
demand (i.e., small networks).  We observe under nonuser-negative externalities that 
such firms have suboptimal incentives for incompatibility from a social welfare 
perspective, just as firms with small networks had excessive incentives for compatibility 
under user-positive externalities.  When the two firms are close in size, the results also 
conform in most cases.  When 2 7 127k
+<  and ( )1 2 7 2792 6, ktk tθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , firm A sets λ  too 
high.  Thus, under nonuser-negative externalities, a firm’s incentives for incompatibility 
may be excessive for moderate levels of relative demand, so long as the costs of 
incompatibility are not too large.  This corresponds to the case of moderate demand under 
user-positive externalities, in which private incentives for compatibility are too low. 
 Interestingly, we find a departure in our results on nonuser-negative externalities 
with respect to Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) findings regarding firms with large networks.  
While Katz and Shapiro find that firms with large networks or good reputations tend to 
be biased against compatibility, we find that they might be biased against incompatibility.  
Specifically, for ( )2 7 1 127 3,k +∈ , when ( )1 2 7 27 96 2,k tktθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , firm A sets λ  too low.  The 
same thing happens for ( )1 23 3,k ∈  when ( )1 2 7 27 36 2,k ttθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
V.  Conclusion 
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 Previous analyses of incentives for compatibility in the context of network 
externalities have focused on the case of user-positive externalities.  The results of these 
studies have suggested that firms undervalue the utility that inframarginal customers gain 
from having a product that is compatible with products used by others.  They focus 
excessively on compatibility as a tool to win over marginal customers.  User-positive 
externalities are conferred mutually by consumers on each other in pairings of compatible 
products.  For this reason, it would appear that the tendency to overweight marginal 
customers’ utility is what causes firms with large or medium-sized networks to choose 
too little compatibility while firms with small networks choose too much.  Small firms 
seem to gain more from the mutual exchange of benefits. 
 This paper has suggested that mutuality is not the reason, or not the only reason, 
that firms’ compatibility incentives are what they are.  Our simple model indicates that 
compatibility is still favored excessively by smaller firms when network sizes are 
lopsided, and sought insufficiently by firms when they are close in size, even when 
network externalities arise from unilateral, rather than mutual, external impacts. 
 The general implication is that public policy has a role in encouraging 
compatibility when competing products have near-equal network sizes.  This is true not 
only when user-positive externalities exist, but also when external costs are imposed by 
users on non-users.  Conversely, policy makers may need to dampen unilateral private 
incentives for compatibility when network sizes are lopsided.  The surprising thing is that 
this may actually mean encouraging firms to impose larger external costs that selectively 
affect rivals’ products!  For example, if SUVs represented a small enough share of the 
motor vehicle market, it might actually improve welfare to make them more hazardous to 
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car drivers, because the price effects of doing would further curtail sales of SUVs.  If 
instead the overwhelming majority of vehicles were SUVs, making them more hazardous 
would improve welfare by reducing further the number of car drivers that incur 
incompatibility losses due to SUVs.  In both cases, increased incompatibility at a per-unit 
level improves welfare by increasing standardization and thereby reducing the adverse 
effects of incompatibility at an aggregate level. 
 Beyond pure compatibility considerations, the broader implications of our results 
for public policy are perhaps equally surprising.  The wisdom that external costs are 
provided excessively in the market and should be reduced is called into question when 
one considers that, in many cases, such costs have implications for the competitive 
equilibrium in markets.11  Situations involving user-imposed externalities should be 
scrutinized to consider whether the externalities selectively, or asymmetrically, affect 
non-users (i.e., are nonuser-negative).  The desirability of certain policy prescriptions, 
such as the use of Pigouvian taxes, might be affected by such asymmetries. 
 
Appendix 
 
A1. Second Order Conditions – Positive Consumption Externalities Case 
 The Hessian in this case is given by 
 
2 2
2
2 2
2
A A
A XA
A A
A X X
pp
p
H
σ
σ σ
∂ Π ∂ Π
∂ ∂∂
∂ Π ∂ Π
∂ ∂ ∂
=  (42) 
                                                 
11 This issue is explored directly by Nagler (2008). 
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where, using (8), (13), (14), and the first-order condition 0A
A
Q
A A pQ p
∂
∂+ = , the components 
are given by 
 
( ) ( )
( )
{ }
( )
2 2
22 2
2 2
3
3
2 1 2 1 2
4 1
2
2 1
X A B XA A
A A
X X X X
A
X
t t p pQp p
t
p
t
σ λ λ λ σ λ θ
σ σ σ σ λ
λ θ
σ λ
− − − − + − − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ Π ∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= =∂ ∂ ∂ − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
(43) 
 ( ) [ ] ( )
2 2
2 2
1 12 2 0
2 1 1
A A A
A A A X X
Q Qp p
p p p t tσ λ σ λ
⎡ ⎤∂ Π ∂ ∂ − −= + = + =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ − − − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 (44) 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1
2
* * *1 1 2 1
A
AA A A
A X X A X
Q
pQ Q A
A Ap p
X X X
Q
p p
t t tσ σ σ
λλ λ
σ λ σ λ σ λ
∂
∂∂ Π ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
−−= + = + =⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
(45) 
Substitution into (42) yields 
 
( ) ( )
( )
{ }
( )
( ){ }
( )
*
2 2
3
3*
22 *4
3
4
1
1 2 1
2
2 1 2 1
1
0
4 1
X X
A
X X
X
X
t t
H
p
t t
t
t
λ
σ λ σ λ
λ θλ
σ λ σ λ
λ θ σ λ
σ λ
−
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦=
⎡ ⎤− − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
− + − −= <− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 (46) 
So all solutions to the first-order conditions are maxima. 
 
A2. Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 
 Differentiate (20) with respect to Xσ , use (13) and (15), and assume an interior 
solution: 
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1 2 2 1
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0
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Q
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2 1 2 2 1
2 2 1 2 1 2
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2 1 2 2 1
1 1
2 X
A X A A
X
A X A X
A A
X X
A X A X
A
X X
t
t
A
Q t p Q
t
Q t p t
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⎧ ⎫− − − − +⎪ ⎪= − − +⎨ ⎬− − − −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
= − − ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ }( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
*
*
* *2
1 3
* *
* * *2 4
3 31
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2 1 1 1
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X
X
X X
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XX
X
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XX
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Q
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Q
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σ λ σ λ θ θ σ λ σ λ
σ λ σ λ
σ λ θ σ λ θ σ λλ σ λσ λ
θ σ λ θλ σ λσ λ
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⎧ ⎫⎧ ⎫ −⎨ ⎬ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪− + − − − − +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭ ⎣ ⎦+⎨ ⎬− − − −⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⎧ ⎫− + − − − −⎪ ⎪= − − +⎨ ⎬− −⎡ ⎤− −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
−= − − + ⎡ ⎤− −⎡ ⎤− − ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
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( ) ( )
4 1
3 2 *
2*
2 1
2 1
A
X
X
Q
t
t
θλ σ λ
σ λ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
− ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
(47) 
Since an interior solution requires 0θ <  and 12AQ < , it follows that 0XWσ∂∂ <  for all 
interior solutions.  Thus, whenever firm A’s network size is small enough that it chooses 
at least partial compatibility, it overinvests in compatibility. 
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 Now we consider the corner solution corresponding to 0Xσ = .  We begin by 
noting that 0A
Xσ
∂Π
∂ ≠  at 0Xσ = ; therefore we may substitute (47) in for XWσ∂∂ , but we must 
add A
Xσ
∂Π
∂  back in.  We do so and evaluate the resulting expression at 0Xσ = : 
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⎡ ⎤= − − + − − − −⎣ ⎦−
⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎣ ⎦− (48) 
So long as 12k ≤ , 0XWσ∂∂ >  for θ  close to zero. 
 
A3. Proof of Proposition 2 and Derivation of Table 1 
 To begin, let us differentiate (41) with respect to λ , assume an interior solution 
(i.e., ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − −  and 19k < ), 
 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] ( ) [ ]
2
2
2
2
0 2 1 2A A A
t
A A A A
Q p QW
A A A A
W t Q p t Q v
t Q Q Q p tλ λ λ λ
λ θ λ θ
λ θ λ∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= Π + − + − + − − + −
⇒ = + − + − + + − + −  (49) 
Using (30) and (32), we find 
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1
31
3 ; 2
AA A Qp Q
tλ λ λ
−∂ ∂= − =∂ ∂ −  (50) 
Substituting (30), (32), and (50) into (49) and factoring yields 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
3 21 4 1
3 3 3
3
2 2 2 4 2
3 2
W t t t t t t
tλ
λ θ λ λ θ
λ
∂
∂
− − − + − + − += −  (51) 
Since 2tλ <  on 0 1AQ< < , hence on c, it follows that 0Wλ∂∂ <  at 2tθ = − .  If we can show 
that 0Wλ∂∂ >  at 32tθ = − , then we will have proven that there exists ( ) ( )32 2,t tkθ ∈ − −  such 
that, for θ θ< , firm A sets λ  too low.  In the neighborhood of 32tθ = − , Aλ∂Π∂  approaches 
k− .  So, using (51), and substituting in 32tθ = −  and 0λ = , we obtain: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
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( )( ) ( )( )
( )
3 21 4 1
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3 21 4 1
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∂Π∂
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 (52) 
 So, 0Wλ∂∂ >  if and only if 13k < .  This satisfies the interior solution requirement of 19k < , 
so we have proven the first part for this case. 
 Now consider ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − −  with ( )1 19 3,k ∈ .  In this case, k is sufficiently large 
that a corner solution of 0λ =  holds for all 2tθ < − .  Note that 0Aλ∂Π∂ ≠  at 0λ = ; 
therefore we may substitute (53) in for Wλ∂∂ , but we must add AXσ
∂Π
∂  back in.  We do so and 
evaluate the resulting expression at 0λ = , simplifying: 
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Differentiating this expression with respect to θ  reveals that Wλ∂∂  is monotone in θ  on 
( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − − : 
 2
8
3
6 22
16 0
24
W t tt
tλ θ
θ θ∂∂ ∂ += = ⇒ = − > −  (55) 
It remains to check the sign of Wλ∂∂  at the endpoints of the interval.  At 32tθ = − , 
1
3
W kλ∂∂ = − , which is positive for 13k < .  At 2tθ = − , it can shown using (54) that 0Wλ∂∂ < .  
Therefore, for ( )1 19 3,k ∈ , there exists ( ) ( )32 2,t tkθ ∈ − −  such that, for θ θ< , firm A sets 
λ  too low.  (It may be observed in passing that 13k >  implies 0Wλ∂∂ <  everywhere on 
( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − − , so private and social incentives conform for setting 0λ =  when 
( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − −  and 13k > .) 
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 Now consider ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − .  As noted in the text, this range corresponds to a 
corner solution in λ : firm A sets λ  to achieve 1AQ =  when the cost of increasing λ  is 
small enough, and it sets 0λ =  otherwise.  Using (32), we find that 32 tλ θ= −  
corresponds to 1AQ = .  Using (24) and comparing firm A’s profits at 0λ =  with its 
profits when 1AQ =  and 32 tλ θ= − , we find that firm A will opt for 1AQ =  when 29tk θ< , 
or, rearranging, when 92 tkθ > .  Thus, we are able to recast firm A’s threshold in terms of 
a level of demand large enough to make increasing λ  worthwhile. 
 The corresponding social threshold in θ  for raising λ  to set 1AQ =  is derived by 
substituting 0λ =  into 0Wλ∂∂ =  and solving for θ .  Setting (54) equal to zero and solving 
for θ  yields (using quadratic formula) 1 2 7 276 ktθ − ± +⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ .  Here, only the positive-signed 
root corresponds to ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − , so that is the relevant one.  One can check that 
1 2 7 27
6
ktθ − + +⎡ ⎤> ⎣ ⎦  corresponds to 0Wλ∂∂ >  in (54). 
 Equating the social and private thresholds and solving for k : 
 1 2 7 27 1 2 796 2 27
k tkt k− + + ±⎡ ⎤ = ⇒ =⎣ ⎦  (56) 
where only the positive-signed root corresponds to 0k >  and is therefore relevant.  Thus, 
for 1 2 727k
+> , the private threshold level of θ  exceeds the social threshold, so that for 
( )1 2 7 27 36 2,k ttθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , firm A sets λ  too low, while for ( )1 2 7 272 6, kt tθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ − ⎣ ⎦ , firm A’s 
incentives conform with social incentives for setting 0λ = .  Meanwhile, for 1 2 727k +< , 
the social threshold exceeds the private threshold, so that for ( )1 2 7 2792 6, ktk tθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , firm 
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A sets λ  too high.  When ( )92 2,t tkθ ∈ − , 1 2 727k +<  corresponds to firm A’s incentives 
conforming with social incentives for setting 0λ = .  Finally, ( )1 2 7 27 36 2,k ttθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  and 
1 2 7
27k
+<  imply that private and social incentives conform for setting 32 tλ θ= −  and 
1AQ = . 
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Table 1.  Summary of social optimality outcomes for firm A’s incompatibility decision. 
 
 
 32tθ < −  ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − −  ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ −  32tθ >  
( )1 2 7270,k +∈  ( )92 2,t tkθ ∈ − : private 
and social incentives 
conform for 0λ = . ( )1 2 7 2792 6, ktk tθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ : 
firm A sets λ  too 
high. ( )1 2 7 27 36 2,k ttθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ : 
private and social 
incentives conform for 
1AQ = . ( )1 2 7 127 3,k +∈  
There exists 
( ) ( )32 2,t tkθ ∈ − −  
such that for θ θ<  
firm A sets λ  too 
low. 
( )1 2 7 272 6, kt tθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ − ⎣ ⎦ : 
private and social 
incentives conform for 
0λ = . ( )1 2 7 27 96 2,k tktθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ : 
firm A sets λ  too low. 
( )9 32 2,tk tθ ∈ : private 
and social incentives 
conform for 1AQ = . 
( )1 23 3,k∈  ( )1 2 7 272 6, kt tθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ − ⎣ ⎦ : 
private and social 
incentives conform for 
0λ = . ( )1 2 7 27 36 2,k ttθ − + +⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ : 
firm A sets λ  too low. 
2
3k >  
Private and 
social 
incentives 
conform for 
0λ = . 
Private and social 
incentives conform 
for 0λ = . 
Private and social 
incentives conform for 
0λ = . 
Private and 
social 
incentives 
conform for 
0λ = .  
( 1AQ =  
regardless.) 
 
